

Sandy 60: Many overflights

U-2, Oct 60

#13 fig: Survey of recons, by 2A to 250; among 6 other
complaints

141 July: 250: Special Task Force to reduce somewhat the
frequency of the U-2 overflight program. U-2 a month 7-

for some reasons (?) went review of pertinent recons with
view to reducing this frequency. MCN + G should be informed

of reasons for continuing. None at present note.

[reported by CANT: CONOR suggested + got approval for 3
Jan 62 from Special Task Force]

overflight/month starting Feb 62.

Time from touchdown to

Initial PI Report by VPIC: 22-18 hrs

Strong. principal objectives are CANT's

time

Current

No strategy
EO:

1. Research: a) Confrontation: CIA, NSA, J-3, JCRCs, State

b) Changes

JCRCs, State, J-3

c) No comparison of crises.

d) Few studies.

Issues: what sorts of info; why needed; means of getting

risks, costs; probabilities of high-level, numerous

of problems found but in stories relating to these

matters; impact of estimates, incidents, on further

recon; conscious "dialog" with Iovs;

Timing, since nature of crisis critically affected by

timing of info flow — as distinct from flow of

espousing decisions, estimates and actions — and that

depended on the influences affecting recon + intell,

including enemy actions (incidents, protest, rearmament,

hostilities/nearby/decapitation). Effects & public pressure

Poss predictions + commitments, decisions on issues, contingencies

planning, initial preparation, relation to political context

[Suppose the bad discovered UK plan 6 weeks before
action, instead of 1 week?]

Johnson ^{by} invited after US elections

airline
Cuba role ready for US invasion to shortwave stations might be
any action to rebel raid, which Cuba says is committed by plane.

North VN before to shortwave AA

NY onto 21 SAM.

Low orders to abort recon. 200-250/mo

in plane controller has ~~two~~ fighter command "are you ready"
orders abort; or abey; other don't, radio failure; etc., down
controller on ground interrupt orders, "Martin assigned altitude"

Cuba: 457 high, 8 low in 63

By mid-60,

USAF Historical Div

Studies of Air Ops in International Incidents & Crises

i) Cuban Crisis 1953 (3) (Banc, Htl)

ii) Taiwan Straits Crisis 1953 (3) Van Staaten

Chronology + Documentation of Air Force Action During

the Cuban Crisis 14 Oct - 23 Nov 62. T3 120 pp

for Sec AF Angell, Kilduff, Berger

250 pp. version of above est completion 15 March 63

Summary + account of AF actions during Cuban Crisis

40 pp. for C/S. First version published 3 Dec 62

Rosenberg, Van Staaten

Consider might continue ft May 62.

Feb 22, 61 JFL-K

In addition, I believe we should make some use of diplomatic channels for just informal discussion of these questions, not in the sense of negotiations (since I am sure that we both recognize the interests of other countries are deeply involved in these issues), but rather as a mechanism of communication which should, so far as is possible, help to eliminate mistrust and unnecessary dangers; however great the basic differences may be. I hope it will be possible, before too long, for us to meet personally for an informal exchange of views in regard to some of these matters.

(Answered May 12, after Cuban exchange of letters & talks with
Thompson; accepts US proposed date of June 7-8 for talks)

Vietnam, Laos, Vietnam, Berlin (no hint of hard line).

(from file)

Feb 15, 62 (Copy to Dr. S., Letter, & message through
SAC to K (and for Dr. S. talk with Ambassador) (in addition to Dr. S.)

... further pressure on the West or Berlin may
increase the pressure with Deacon & the Red Rep to
build a greater military force, to ensure an independent
military capability and to adopt a more rigid attitude in
accommodation.

... I send with frankness of this notes to you ~~because~~
the hope that you will report in kind. It can assure
you that I will continue to hold in the utmost secrecy
any message or proposal sent through this channel, for I
have always regarded it as a private and confidential
means of communication, without all of the pressures which
public communication bring to any question of this kind.
I judge that such an exchange, if successful, would
represent a considerable departure from normal diplomacy.

[? b/c?] But, surely we both recognize that our
situation requires new methods of procedure.

How much is Israel? What an effort?

Did it suggest to K, JFK willingness & ability to negotiate

Jan 5, 62 JFK Copy to K's talk with Dobrynin

I am glad to learn from you from Mr. Dobrynin that

Mr. Dobrynin has your confidence in normal relations

between India and Soviet Union

all VFC after election?

Jan 10, 62 Copy to Feb 15 JFK & US 3 members of India.

K to JFK

... I would not like to leave anything unclear - or
anyway as neither ever will sign a Non-Proliferation Treaty

I have already said at Geneva, and repeat it now that

if there is no other choice we will make use of the US

people and the lesson which was taught us by the unification
some last week regarding affiliated parties in the USA -

22 May ... Roa told Western diplomat (?) 11 May that
had no definite plans for a strike at the U.S.
against the airflight - Roa did not then want
over a serious incident developing (apart from
that the possibility ...). Said he previously believed
that after the November elections the U.S. might
become convinced that there was no strategic
missile threat on the island, and that O-2
recon was therefore not necessary.

[Who? See exact wording.]

E

Shabat will not stand for reelection. Over one cold bed again
to struggle like civil war.

England in "colonial campaign," in face of general election.

setting for its invasion

In Special Thorp (Argentina) as of 27 Aug. 1961,

CK, MG, Giffen, Taylor, Kuntzer, Lansdale:

(Johnson?)

(begin 22 Oct)

Talk to Patterson, Andrew Van Claveren.

Charged US intends to blockade; this would be an act of war; Sov vessels have orders to proceed even if fired on by US warships; SOV would use tanks & rockets to enforce right of passage. But K believed there would be no war over Cuba.

["Strange" fear of US blockade.]

H-20's in Checklist, 11 Oct. Nothing on inside -

29 Aug? JFK: "not at this time."

30 Aug: Krost discusses fears of blockade.

31 Aug: Radio Moscow on JFK press conf ignored J.F.K.
affection of remark on Cuba; said "The USSR is far from delighted at what is going on in neighboring
Trinidad & Tobago," when US news report "a direct
threat to the security of the USSR."

1 Sept N.Y.T calls for calm w. reference; denies there will be

NR, 13 Sept

1) ~~light~~ USSR statement: By delaying that the Cuban
negotiations can await the completion of the fell
elections in the US, the Sovs have recognized the
distrust in negotiations and have sought to place
this problem in the background (for the time being) probably
in the belief that this would temper what they might
consider to be planned US actions against Cuba.

• I suppose Downing, Tongue, etc. brief of Cuba
& Berlin meant: 1) If you don't announce missile,
we'll keep quiet on Berlin — till after elections.
2) If you do cause a Cuban crisis,
we'll give you a Berlin crisis too — before elections.
3) Whenever you give us trouble on Cuba,
we'll bring up Berlin.]

How does intell. commun — other than batted — over the
statements of Soviets privately to officials as intelligence?

Did they know at time? How would these have affected
their estimates?

Why did CIA analysts come to interpret DIA's instruction in
May '62 and mid-Aug to check out with NPIC any report
unverifiable to photo verification as a restriction against
publishing anything (was in Pres Checklist) that was unverifiable
of photo verification and had not (yet) been verified.

(even though no flights between 5-27 Aug). [Effect on
items in appendix numbers even in Checklist, even after flight 20;
several limitations, during S+M buildup.] [not intended to
limit publication.]

To what extent was Pres + McG + Sec State informed
of reports after 15 Sept, not published? (MK & JCS
informed by DIA).

522-9900 Mrs. Connell - telephone

K letters

1. What was effect of slowing letters to US, Mac?

Have allies seen others?

2. What was specific answer to misleading use of demands?

What is role of current intelligence bulletins? Of
"publishing"? Who does this advocate?

role of U Thant Oct 24-25, 28-30

Rustacean

Tinley - Cuba

International Conflict and Behavioral Science

Roger Fisher

Basic Books N.Y. 1981

A A

Turks are right after this: "K" was claimed
by the picture of Disney in 1960

Z

-A

Joint Conference of 1855 - all the arms deal

Chenail-Bell 10/24/62 9:40

C. Adles is being like a star over this statement.

He wants to indicate some softening of our position.

(Letter to G.A.P. C. Hunt)

Pres-Bell 10/24 10:45

(On letter) It seems to me that this record will be published.
My two letters to him and his two to me.

10/24/62 3:25 pm Bundy-Bell: The 6 next
intensity ships have turned back. Starting at they union
See + Bell only 2 told so far.

Chab-Bell 5:20 10/24/62 Congress getting expression movement
united. Bell: No. ^{SO} operation more political than military.
If want to see what can be done on a political level,
just as we do.

(Brandon had just been in Cuba).

10/24/62: Bundy-Bell 8:05, 8:25

(Bund was anti-torpedo intercepter. NOV wants to intercept
torpedoes to turn him back; Bell wants; Bundy?

Basic orders to Navy: not forcing "nonaggression blockade,"
take anything that comes, but: a blockade with instructions from NOV
as to which ship to inform it on.

(That evening, Pers gave Congress information we were not going to stop
torpedoes. "Moral" no POL blockade, but ships might be needed.

are threatening us with various misfortunes, but I
think they are more clever in their designs than in their
words because only Americans can carry them with
war but Americans are always mean people. So to
myself, consider that our contacts with whom we
conduct conversations are mostly moral people and
can realistically evaluate and understand what the
world needs to attack the SC or another country.

I believe that we, the more educated will first
trust and responsibility by our peoples, should understand
all this correctly and should oppose opinions which
sometimes push us to go the wrong way. To say it
straight; It is not frightening each other with words.
We have our ways of frightening you, Mr. Pres., but that's it!
in WWII, we participated not only in that war.
Both of us are aware what war means and as the leaders
of states we know what military means we need at the

disposal of the USSR & the USA. Let us not count
by pieces while the world has fewer means
means of mass destruction. Each of our countries has
already stockpiled more than enough weapons to
feel an impulsive devastating blow.

The SO intends to conclude a three year Treaty
(refers to UK action of international organ or arms
to Berlin, raised by Redgrave for SO).
possibly by a condition that
troops are stationed there are withdrawn; will allow
symbolic contingent of UN personnel there for 3-5 years
(refers to sonow's confidential conversation with SO:
since no progress on Berlin, UK wouldn't necessary to insist
in was when the soonest attainment of an agreement (th
the SO is feasible; this document is area, & first fell
the test ban; said that UK would like to have a summit meeting
& always willing.]

Bob will soon arrive - He enjoys the full confidence
of the SG and my full confidence. Whenever you want
to convey something to me in a confidential way he will
be able to transmit that to me personally.

(earlier) Our proposal is a concession to you. We do not
want to create difficulties for you, Mr. Pres., and your
country because in your country there are lot-roads; may be
there are some more than others too. These questions are
correctly understood in our country and by our other

[Final negotiations; I will have
telephoned VPK with the result.]

Sept 4, 62 Informal Comm from JFK-JFK.

(re JFK-Mac statement of Aug 27)

Let us immediately sign an agreement on the
exclusion of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and
under water but at the same time let us agree that
w.r.t. underground tests negotiations will go on with me
to reach an agreement on the underground tests as well.
... (suggests moratorium during negotiations.)

Sept 28, 62 L to JFK re Nuclear testing (in WH)
+ Cebu

Oct 3, 62 JFK-K

I am giving careful consideration to your communication
of Sept. 28, and I am glad that we can continue
to use this channel as a means of communicating friendly and
frankly.

I shall want to comment separately on other aspects
of your letter, but because of the infinite desirability
of the SV I want you to have my views promptly on the
subject of nuclear testing. I believe we are nearer to
agreement on this issue than on others, and I believe that
we should keep at it to see if we cannot promptly
reach the understanding which the world wants & needs.

If, for example, to recent Payments say, ~~that~~ we
can suggest that the agreement we can now
promptly make on cessation of tests in the atmosphere,
in outer space & under water be accompanied by a
5-year moratorium on underground explosions. But
surely it will not take 5 years to reach agreement if agreement
is ever to be reached — on doing underground tests —
considerable, other treaty has
Is I continue to think that we are within striking
distance of a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere,

from and under water. I believe we should try to work out such an agreement in time to meet the target day of Jan 1, 1963.

invariably, negotiate or underground tests. To agree to the modest number of on-site inspections necessary to support black bags. (With K proposed 2⁺3; we proposed 8; it said more, because not needed and being, not only "credible" investigators would be selected by USSR.)

Dec 28, 62 JFK-K (public) refers to K-VFK Dec 19.

W.R.L. number of on-site inspections, affirms to USSR
some understanding. Your expression seems to be that
(Allegedly on Oct 30, in NY)
Amb. Dran told Kryzhevov that the US might be prepared
to accept an annual number of on-site inspections between 8 + 9.
Amb. Dran advises me that the only number which he
mentioned in his discussions with K was between 8 + 10.

Other

Intens of "trust" - less.

Foot of neon on 30-31 Oct.

Outer canvas cover wound on sides, but not inner
covering, apparently a rubber jacket.

No sign search on 1-2 Nov? (Circles might have
been redeployed?)

L Suppose we want to establish inspection agreement
first in crisis : plan, preparation, UN.

As Cuba, did this rely on Cuban intransigence to frustrate?
Did they move out first to frustrate?

[Effects of alarm on "incidents": Cubans shot down
two of their ^{own} liaison planes during May alarm, 1964.

What "disturbances" may be destabilizing (a) lead
to sellers active consideration of response; b) lead to
action; lead to alarming signals to opponent.]

[Heads of state as "partners"; binders went each other's
publics; often explicit conversation; each recognizes
other's need to decease public + allies, need allies or
other to maintain certain events, may help other in such
deception, events; helps other's pretenses; do accept or disbelieve or ^{May be silent}
Analogies? Cops + robbers? Hypothetical? What?

Strategic reserves of POC were stored on island to

accommodate military equipment; one area seen on 11 Nov 53.

(Not seen before? Would this have frustrated Vlastisl?)

Prob C+C bids: appeared in Morse 23 Oct, Scrabben 23 Oct.

Fist info on use of deception by Sovs: 13 Nov. during 17
rec'd on info (without cockpit). One dummy still being
assembled.

42. 446-212 seen on 16 Dec; of 37 seen earlier (17 Oct),
most certain all there by 17 Oct; were had the other 3
been?

Benedios except discovered 25 Oct. By 18 Nov, at 1
9 regiment around task forces: all over 4000 traps.

Indon est: about 1200 (4 very bns).

All established since July. (?)

Ind trap at least 1000-1500, perhaps 2500

i.e. Total: 9000-10,000.

It necessary to determine types & quantity, count
estimating 9,000 ft. runway, underground storage & hangars at 4 sq.
miles. Sovs planned to base CIA bombers and probably
the was true. [Indonesia.]

At least one shot with Il-28's was missed.

Discovery of Il-28 crates was stimulus for new search of
14-15 Oct?

8 Oct: incorporated reports of Il-28 crates arriving, column 1
Est. of photos of 28 Sept published 10 Oct.

Crusader missile: spotted 29 Aug; reported as probable cruise
missile, 7 Sept; confirmed 17 Sept.

Deployment night continue to fill gaps.

Komarov first arrived 18 Aug.

Il-18-C1 first seen 5 Sept. First 3; induction 13 Oct.

Surface-to-air missiles first seen 5 Nov.

How much time had Adm/Intell figures could
be available between time missiles might be identified
and time they could be fired?

7 slips collected by Moscow in individual cipher messages,
6 hours after Pres. speech. Turned best.

End in Cuba 7-8 Sept; Oneabury 29 Aug, 8-10 Oct.

[Possible lie by K that mics were in Cuba, so as
to reassure US that he had around them (K to Andre
Roberts, 12 Nov. 17)

3 slips WAS THIS USED ON S41PS TO QUBA? (tentative)
mention of "ball effect": increase in readings of motion
slips in excess of ball of a slip. Motion detectors.
(at high reading, from Land). (Fahr star possible?
New effect; not completely understood).
enhanced detector, rainstorm, high voltage.

[Suppose VFL had to justify action to public, thus without releasing photos. Who then might have thought VFL would be reluctant to release? Who then might be have been?]]

The high flights suitable for search after 23 Oct? (time 22.00)
(e.g., no new sites detected. Warheads; IRBMs.)

33 IRBMs identified by 8 Nov; on 4 Nov, Kyrntow announced 41 to McCly.

Thought possible at time that a few IRBMs did arrive and remain undetected, but none seen during, whereas many IRBMs were detected; assumed, therefore, that no IRBMs

Sat-2 33 7 ft x 2 had been brought. Even if IRBMs hidden,

Sat-3 Elster 54' ^{no cover} sites take a long time to construct,

Sat-4 Sandal 65' ^{no cover} could be detected.

[Consider political implications of 'undone' that missed, local remained in Abu! McCly's factories.]]

R-JFK, Thurs (given by Dr. to Lee,
(Many - explosion of Rows 62, Dec 62)

K-JFK in me tests, Dec 19, 62 (released 1/20/63)

Pres left after Roberts stay 11/15. Det.

Diet Davis, EUR

12/14/62 9:55 Deb needs Pres info to

Deb wants to know who private TV fellow was, went
for private stand

Bell: we don't know if that was done with his approval

he might not even know it.

(Deb connected this with "dangerously misleading info".)

Roster to Pres, Dec 29
1962

The auto from Tinkley presented

McC before Malor Comm Feb 5 63

A
One CS official position is always the agreed intell set
published in full...
worked out with other intell agencies. When I advise McC
of what our own analysts' view is, we sometimes advise
him that we feel the official ests are on the low or high
side. As his report to Pres in August indicated, we
were advising him throughout that period that we
thought the official ests were considerably in error
the low side, that in turn we would gather intell which
would prove that the figures were larger.
our unofficial, in-house view.

McC said yesterday it is our judgment, ^{now} that the first
offensive missiles arrived in Cuba about Sept 8, and the reports
on those we received about Sept 21st. These reports were
^(in Nook)
refugee agent reports and had to be verified. So, the
orders went out for the flight to verify them on Oct 4, but
weather intervened and were not able to (till Oct 14).

Effect of Secong: "Thinking out" is postponed for both sides till last minute until action. e.g. actor doesn't know, how responses to his intentions, tendencies, and if reactors to his actions will be. Hypoth.

1 Consider general effects of discovering sooner;

2, imagining/gaming/planning sooner?

Effects of gaming in reducing surprise? All good?

(or, do they reduce chance of ever taking violent action; as well as chance of paralysis? Balance?)

2) Hypothetical experiment: Shift the info flows and planning flows relative to the underlying event/energy action/decision flows.

Any situation in which action was immediately planned, prepared must be considered to prevent possible major loss. arises, the question: Why wasn't action taken already? Why is red alert first now, on such a short deadline? (The question assumes that the flow of events creating the problem, the challenge to action, ^{was} not "in fact" discontinuous. Though our knowledge or awareness of the on the implications might be; Was there not early "indication" of this need?

(Crisis: an urgent "problem"; not merely an urgent need to act, to react (with the one obviously appropriate act).)

Problem: There is difficult, non-obvious; in fact, set of alternatives, goals, relevant contingencies, etc. must be defined; search + invention, calculation + evaluation are needed.

Crisis: a "problem" with a ^{short} deadline.

Can be graded in terms of importance (gravity, goals, risks involved); difficulty; novelty:

Causes to expect (in pattern of past):

- 1) U-2's against SAAMS (whole issue of deciding whether to send them. How much has/hill been won/lost this "dialog."? Who wins in current debate?
Note switch concern of drones.
- 2) Recon vs. protests and threats.
- 3) Appearance of ~~SAAMS~~ SA-2s in North Vietnam

[As in Pearl Harbor: available info fell into a coherent pattern, which was exactly in line with one of the major hypotheses predicted earlier (and in fact, predicted earlier). Data

X = true hyp (less initial prob); Y - favorite Z-stems
Given data (which does not support X but doesn't strongly disprove it), $\text{prob}(Z)$ goes down almost to 0; $\text{prob}(Y)$ goes up almost to 1 [subject only to reversal of early decisions/actions]. $\text{prob}(X)$ goes down slightly ~~almost to~~ to $\text{prob}(Y)$: so former relationship of X to Y is preserved (say, 10:1)

(If they did

Say; Cuba;

But if lack of positive evidence for X (e.g. y_1 is taken as highly significant (e.g. courage is unquestioned; enemy overly underestimated; enemy desertion underestimated); enemy lead-time to move from Y to X unquestioned); if X and Y regarded as exclusive or competitive) then $\frac{\text{prob } X}{\text{prob } Y}$ goes down slightly: $\text{prob } X$ may even decline.

Mr. Tidwell : CIA number of COMOR.

Sgt. Ben Craig } J-3 Caribbean Survey Group (CSG)
Col. John Wright

Cols. Cole, Hill, Capt. Grayson: DIA XX

McNeelton

[Doesn't trinity + form of Chen 84-2's encourage
spread of 84-2's?]

Burkhardt - Vogt

[Problems with V-3 studies: undifferentiated? excess of members
(see memo to OSD on Laos?)

[New insiders' "experience"/education/cultural background
is guaranteed to differ from old insiders']

Anticipation
Breaks in pattern

Giving count at end-August: military buildup and extraordinary law bloc econ controls meant to the most extensive campaign to bolster a non-bloc country ever undertaken by USSR."

Before "such an

On file 6, Ball accused by affidavit of having understood
to return com on Oct 3, intent of info & "evidence"
^(it to be true)
p. 894: "We have no evidence that there are any 500:
in Alabama capable of firing to a greater range than 30 mts.

[Ball's statement prepared by Salazar, checked by M.C.
by telephone, on basis of CIB and SIS.]
M.C. Ball said, "by implication" he did not have
evidence ... a fair statement at the time.

M.C. agent report was important not because by itself it
gave great evidence that there were ballistic missiles but

Ford: strange that second highest offer in late
would not move; serious that he should underestimate
inexplicable, shameful (MCNS language about Rogers)

On Sept 23, Bill Brady said to Melton Com. Q: "Does the
military have any instell. indicating the existence of nuclear
ball. miss. in Cuba?" "No sir, it does not."

Connell: 2 agent reports - One says became it established
to pinpoint the location involved.

One more says there was a refugee report.

3 DDCIs in Presidential Brief that did not seem to note my email
in relation to a particular military location instell. Credible,
a logical relation.

McV: I largely thought analysis that this suspicion arose:

It was not based on a report that the suspicion

arose [in - a piece couples together] 7.5"

had had thousands of reports like this (?)

What gradually found in this was a hypothesis

based on the utilization of 3 or 4 pieces of evidence (one

plate analysis of SAM sites)

... a hypothesis that had been formulated previously

and had been tested previously and found to be correct

in respect to other locations. The only action here

quite properly ... was to test that hypothesis.

See Bell either had nor had any reason to know of
this info. Could be did not ... See State did

not ... entirely did not have benefit of the nationalization
we were undergoing, because we wanted to put it to the test

to determine whether we had anything adequately substantiated

to report.

intention

McV: All of the suspicions of our intell. analysts are not
submitted to me, for example daily. I have a hard enough

in ready the intel reports that do come up in world

have been inappropriate to distribute all these suspicions

I feel strongly that there was no reason why (Ball)

should have known at that time of this kind of suspicion.

There are hundreds of suspensions of this kind taken in

some areas of the world that are very important to us.

99% of the suspensions prove wrong.

Ford - But by your suggestion enough

not... to designate the suspect area for the next

(?) U-2 mission.

[i.e. because specific location designated, possible to
make a very small adjustment in US actions? Effectively treat
of flight schedule for other purpose. This did not receive
much weight given to mission. Who gave it weight?]

Appointments: Aug 1968

Sept 5: Sec State: first FR + AS Comm Export Control

Sept 12: Martin Comm on FR

Sec State JFA + AS

Sept 14: Sec State Comm on FA

Sept 17: " Comm on FR + Comm on AS

Oct 3 Ball Export Control

from 11, 14, 17, 20, 23 Sec State

Feb 7: Koller, Comm on FA

[Stevens vs. Castro's blockade, pay-off proposals]

Danger of trying ineffective policy; likelihood that
measures ineffective unless credible threat of force.

See Feb 7 & 8, Stevens: McC Test.

Frank Stevens: on Andrius comm., + CIA info com
for 31 Jan gathering + eval. of info by intell comm either promptly
inapt, dangerously inadequate, or both.

'McC Test. before NCV intell briefings led to their bringing
to NCV with censure (Saltonstall) ... on his confidence:

McC: I had no doubt that Sov main base would + could survive
as ab enemy base: existence of such a base would be highly
desirable.

U-2 situation, April 63

SO/S/State

Exploration of contingencies and politically feasible

means for taking severe steps to apply U-2 power to reduce

Castro power's positive influence. Political + power entities,

including USSR ability to intervene west in Berlin +

blundering, reckless arbitrary and unilateral action,

without provocation, to eliminate Castro.

USSR will be most likely to attack first. Unwarranted attack

might be feature of control; provide for a minimum response,

friendly; hold Castro responsible, initially

[JCS subjected to above?]

C. When I left for Africa, I had been greatly concerned by the
situation. (?) the USSR was introducing offensive weapons (I-183-1) into
Cuba, I had tried to warn him that when the situation was quite serious,
Russia would have no alternative but to take the first kind of response.
Now 15 Bowles - Deb again (15th)

Bowles added it was my assumption that the Am's had
not personally known that offensive weapons were being
placed there; he seemed pleased to be this bit off the
hook.

[Even without being asked by K, Deb must
have been sending warnings based on private conversations,
though, if K thought Adam already knew... e.g. by Oct 13
Bowles - Deb talk...]

Bowles: basic situation could only be compared to a US
military pact with Finland, followed by an attempt by us
to live the Finnish-Sov border with missiles aimed at our
cities. In such circumstances I was sure that the Soviet
reaction would not differ greatly from our own.

[Would Sov intellig predict or discover this?]
What Sov intellig failures could we predict?

Wktrm: C/A roll : contnugt to intell. com

Stevenson (proposed) letter to K on Wednesday (?)

Please understand Mr. Clark that we are prepared to discuss the basis in the context of the general disarmament treaty. This we have been committed to for four years.

I tried to make clear it was in favor of using the present existing wording.

[Bill, Gilpatric, Johnson deliberately (?) left off Smith-Stephens of Britain] (Name on "coordinating committee") [Singer, Stevenson, Nitze? Johnson? Brown Smith?]

On Saturday (?) in Oval Room: solemn agreement that

nobody there would ever disclose the views of anybody else or his own.

Finitely: proposed lead of article: 5 warheads who disagree with the Pres. wanted to invoke & air strike

Bill: story story as though the real ideas were the ones who were taken off base.

Hulka

2 pm 24 Oct. Cleveland: recommends broadening
of discussion to include Turkish-Soviet border
problems

See: 10

Resolution might be put forward by US and/or other
affiliated neutrals:

"Defanging Resolution":

Security Council: noting

Requests the nuclear powers: a. to halt the delivery of
or further long-range nuclear delivery vehicles (including
MRBMs, IRBMs, ICBMs) to foreign states outside the Treaty;
the nuclear powers.

- b. to render inoperable all such weapons already located
in such foreign states, and
- c. to arrange by agreement among them to remove such
weapons from the territories of such foreign states at the
earliest possible time.

Rostow: thinks Cuba fell in category of "unusual" Sov actions -
with high degree of risk. Other "unusual" actions which
until now had failed to predict: 1) ~~part~~ of Sov ~~war~~
after war (?) ; 2) attack on South Korea; 3) development
of 100 MT bomb. [removal of testing?]

1) In case of Korea + Cuba, Moscow had also failed
to predict our reaction [Was our reaction "unusual"?]

2) Certain possible "unusual" actions had not materialized:
e.g. full-scale exploitation of the ICBM potential.

(Unusual? We did predict?)

Cuba: prior frustration, timing opportunity \rightarrow wishful thinking?

See New York's 1453 of Oct 24, our 1085 of Oct 25,

Djakarta 742 of Oct 25.

MCC & ~~myself~~ had the same concern that Keating did
and planned it long before he did and before my
departure on Aug 23 I apparently expressed concern but I
had no hard until to support it.
Information on agent reports... & including it was a
theory which I have expressed that our people felt that
the Jews would not move into a confrontation of the type they + I

Galloway talked to Carter on Oct 12 on Keating charges.

Stingers at Sea's Staff meeting 9:15
Oct 3, 1963, running if testimony required
CIA item distributed day before now considered signed by itself soon.

On 19 Sept large intercontinental rockets, more than
20 meters long, were unloaded in Manila, from the Re Provost.
The rockets were on large trailers which were unloaded from
the ship.

Headquarters Comint: It is more likely that some observed
SA-2 missiles being offloaded.

Brent, Toddhunter

Mar 6 Press Conf:

Q: any clues ... is that your CI chief, NC actually
knew before Oct 14 that the Sovs had planted offensive
missiles in Cuba.

[Most significant evidence to Soviets was lack of more actions]

[Analyze a) intel comm eval. of evidence

& expectation of warning; Tim of intel.,
advisory of coverage, Sov strategy

(Was Sov "despatch" important to intell. com?)

Did they know?

c) intel comm prior prob

d) basis for: 1) more flights, targeting

2) diseng in intel com

3) Sovs public statements

4) queries, private statements to Sovs

5 June 64

CA 1. Sov. world would not regard US demand for return of all Sov military specialists as excessive or vindictive. (Note K offers) This would make SA-2s & cruise missiles inoperable (no training of Cubans), & some of KOMARs & MIG-21s.

[We didn't realize the size of Sov forces]